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How Hackers of Submarine Cables May Be Held Liable
Under the Law of the Sea
Jason Petty

Abstract
Submarine internet cables play a vital role in the modern economy and transmit almost all
global internet connections between countries. These cables, however, are vulnerable to interference
or hacking by foreign states who seek to obtain the valuable data that passes through them.
Because these cables are located on the high seas, however, no country has legal jurisdiction over
large portions of them allowing for any number of states or private actors to hack into them and
steal valuable information. This Comment evaluates whether states have any legal recourse under
public international law against entities that hack into submarine cables. To answer this
question, this Comment explores the development of public international law with respect to the
high seas and evaluates public international norms for hacking and cyber operations. This
Comment then argues, given the weakness of current domestic regimes with respect to submarine
cable protections, the International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea can assert jurisdiction over
disputes related to submarine hacking. This Comment further makes the novel argument that
states can assert damage done to cables through hacking or violations of citizens’ rights to privacy
through hacking present potential legal avenues to pursue liability against submarine hacking.
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I. I NTRODUCTIO N
Contrary to popular belief, the global internet is largely comprised of a
network of data cables linking states and continents and not satellite links
propelling data through the air.1 In communications between continents,
approximately 99% of all telecommunications is transmitted via a network of
around 400 underwater, submarine cables. 2 For example, to send an email from
Boston to Dublin, the GTT Atlantic Cable would route your message under the
Atlantic Ocean through Nova Scotia, Northern Ireland, and London before
arriving in Dublin. 3 This process would take place nearly instantaneously but
traverse hundreds of miles of fiber optic cable under the Atlantic Ocean.
These undersea cables are only about the size of a garden hose but represent
billions of dollars of productivity and information. If a ship were to drop anchor
in the wrong location and sever a cable, internet service could be cut to an entire
country.4 If a rogue agent elected to cut the cables to the United States, an
estimated $10 trillion in daily financial transfers and vast amounts of data would
be clogged up.5 Because damage to submarine cables is so devastating, the
international community has devised a number of conventions and domestic
protections to protect against cable damage.
More insidiously, however, these cables are also at risk of hacking and
intelligence gathering because so much data flows through them. States can use
submarines to make small slits in submarine cables and insert listening and data
collection devices.6 These spying states then collect all the information that flows
through the cables: every overseas telephone call, email, financial transfer, or data
upload that passes through the internet from one country to another is collected.7
Encryption of information that passes through these cables somewhat protects
against intelligence gathering, but sophisticated operators can often break
encryption and can nevertheless obtain useful information through the metadata

1

See, generally Edward Malecki & Hu Wei, A Wired World: The Evolving Geography of Submarine Cables
and the Shift to Asia, 99 ANNALS ASS’N AM. GEOGRAPHERS 360 (2009).

2

Greg Miller, Undersea Internet Cables are Surprisingly Vulnerable, WIRED (Oct. 29, 2015),
https://perma.cc/X53J-XMHA.

3

Submarine Cable Map, TELEGEOGRAPHY, https://perma.cc/S2SR-FL66 (2021).
Chris Baynes, Entire Country Taken Offline for Two Days After Undersea Internet Cable Cut, INDEP. (Apr
11, 2018), https://perma.cc/26LE-P6QD.
Tim Johnson McClatchy, Undersea Cables: Too Valuable to Leave Vulnerable, GOV’T TECH. (Dec. 12,
2017), https://perma.cc/AH3X-TPMX.
Christopher Drew, Divers Say Net Tied Submarine to Listening Device, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 9, 2005),
https://perma.cc/YXS8-ACXT.
Sophia Ankel, Russian Intelligence Agents Reportedly Went to Ireland to Inspect Undersea Cables, and It’s
Reigniting Fears They Could Cut Them and Take Entire Countries Offline, BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 17, 2020),
https://perma.cc/8CE7-V38L.

4

5

6

7

262

Vol. 22 No. 1

Submarine Cable Hacking and Law of the Sea

Jason Petty

embedded in encrypted transmissions.8 This massive amount of information
provides valuable military, economic, and personal information to the hacking
country. This hacking, however, is also a violation of citizens’ privacy and a
violation of the hacked states’ economic and military interests.
Out of concern for this sort of hacking, in 2020 the U.S. blocked Google
and Facebook from turning on a submarine cable linking the U.S. and Hong
Kong.9 Although the 8,000 mile cable had already been laid and hundreds of
millions of dollars were spent on its development, the U.S. was too concerned
about potential Chinese intelligence pilfering to let the cable go live.10 The
decision dramatically demonstrates the U.S.’s fears around submarine cable
hacking have grown to exceptional new heights. And the U.S. government’s fears
are not misplaced. In 2013, the British spy agency the Government
Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) was found to secretly have tapped into
undersea cables to gather information.11 In 2015, U.S. sensors detected Russian
submarines near undersea cables raising concerns.12 And during the Cold War, the
U.S. tapped into Soviet undersea cables and gathered critical intelligence as part
of Operation Ivy Bells.13
As the world becomes increasingly interconnected and states increasingly
rely on the internet economically, hacking into internet infrastructure becomes a
greater threat. The U.S., for example, has undertaken expensive and extensive
efforts to remove Huawei from its domestic telecommunication infrastructure to
prevent the Chinese government from spying domestically.14 Undersea cables,
however, are not so easily protected. Undersea cables are expensive to lay, 15

8

DOUG BRAKE, INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION FOUND., SUBMARINE CABLES: CRITICAL
INFRASTRUCTURE FOR GLOBAL COMMUNICATIONS (2019), https://perma.cc/8YQ8-T9TL.

9

Anthony Spadafora, Google, Facebook Undersea Web Cable Will No Longer Connect US and Hong Kong,
TECHRADAR (Aug. 31, 2020), https://perma.cc/U8YZ-FXXS.

10

Justin Sherman, The US-China Battle over the Internet Goes Under the Sea, WIRED (June 24, 2020),
https://perma.cc/5X8K-8FY4.

11

Ewen MacAskill, Julian Borger, Nick Hopkins, Nick Davis & James Ball, GCHQ Taps Fibre-optic
Cables for Secret Access to the World’s Telecommunciations, THE GUARDIAN (June 21, 2013),
https://perma.cc/4DGD-HRN5.
Barbara Starr, U.S. Sensors Detect Russian Submarines Near Underwater Cables, CNN (Oct. 28, 2015),
https://perma.cc/RL96-QV9L.
Olga Khazan, The Creepy, Long-Standing Practice of Undersea Cable Tapping, THE ATLANTIC (July 16,
2013), https://perma.cc/W8GY-F5R2.
David McCabe, F.C.C. Designates Huawei and ZTE as National Security Threats, N.Y. TIMES (June 30,
2020), https://perma.cc/PW37-6Z2Y.
Tim Hornyak, Here’s What It Takes to Lay Google’s 9,000km Undersea Cable, COMPUTERWORLD (July
13, 2015), https://perma.cc/EHL6-GSMX (approximately $300 million for a cable between the
U.S. and Japan).

12

13

14

15
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difficult to replace, and often traverse international waters over which states do
not have exclusive domain.16
Even with such a large threat, there is an open question as to whether states
can protect against submarine cable hacking. The fundamental question this
Comment seeks to answer is whether states have any recourse or protections
against submarine cable hacking by foreign states under public international law.
This Comment argues the increasingly recognized international right to privacy
can provide grounds for protecting against submarine cable hacking and that
states can enforce this right through dispute resolution mechanisms for the high
seas.
This Comment proceeds in five sections to develop this answer. Section II
provides a brief overview of the technology behind submarine cables and the
methods used in hacking these cables. Section III evaluates current attitudes in
the international community with respect to submarine cable hacking and explains
why norms around privacy, combined with the incredible resources required to
protect cables from hacking, may lead to a shift in states’ treatment of submarine
cable hacking.
Section IV explores the history of international treaties and conventions
surrounding submarine cables and the high seas. Section V summarizes current
public international law related to cyber operations and hacking and discusses the
emergence of a newly recognized international right to privacy with respect to
telecommunications and personal data. Section VI discusses current scholarly
responses to submarine cable hacking to situate this Comment’s solution in
present scholarship. And in Section VII, I propose a novel solution addressing the
problem of submarine cable hacking using the international right to privacy
adjudicated through dispute resolution mechanisms developed for the high seas.
The use of the international right to privacy and this dispute resolution body is
presently underdiscussed by scholars. This solution further advances the right to
privacy as integral to protect against submarine cable hacking and describes how
shifts in attitudes toward privacy may contribute to the creation of norms against
surveillance hacking.

II. T ECHNICAL P RIMER ON H ACKING AND S UBMARINE
C ABLES
This Section describes the network of submarine cables that makes up the
modern internet, the technical elements of modern submarine cable hacking
techniques, and the possibility of damage by submarine cable hacking. This
information is relevant to subsequent possible solutions around submarine cable
16

James Griffiths, The Global Internet Is Powered by Vast Undersea Cables. But They’re Vulnerable, CNN
(July 26, 2019), https://perma.cc/3VJM-LQQD.
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hacking because international treaties require some protections against incidental
or intentional damage to submarine cables, as discussed in Section IV.
Most of the internet is formed through a network of undersea submarine
cables.17 About the size of a garden hose, these cables are buried just under the
ocean floor by submarine-cable laying ships and transmit internet data between
countries.18 While there are some legacy cables that transmit primarily telephone
or telegraph information, the majority of modern cables are fiber optic cables that
can transmit dozens of Terabytes of data per second.19 While some cables are
specially created for military and intelligence transmission purposes, the majority
of cables are general in use and transmit commercial, government, and private
commercial correspondence simultaneously.20
Because laying and operating a cable across large bodies of water is so costly,
most cables were historically financed, laid, and operated by a consortium of
multiple owners. For example, the U.S., Japan, and Australia agreed in 2020 to
jointly finance a cable link to the Pacific island nation of Palau at a cost of $30
billion.21 Despite this history, individual companies or governments increasingly
financed and laid submarine cables.22 For example, in 2020 Google announced it
was financing and constructing its own cable linking the U.S., the United
Kingdom, and Spain.23
Once laid, cables are maintained and operated by the financing consortium
or the private company financing the cable project. These cable operators are
responsible for maintenance and repairs for any damage to the cable. Due to their
length, most modern cables are outfitted with fault monitoring systems that can
detect cable breaks or points of damage for repair.24
States are capable of spying on submarine cables. As discussed below,
because the hacking of cables requires specialized equipment including
submarines, most experts are concerned with government-sponsored hacking
17

Id.

18

Stewart Ash, The Development of Submarine Cables, in SUBMARINE CABLES: THE HANDBOOK OF LAW
AND POLICY 19 (Douglas R. Burnett, Robert C. Beckman & Tara C. Davenport eds., 2014).

19

Klint Finley, How Google Is Cramming More Data into Its New Atlantic Cable, WIRED (Apr. 5, 2019),
https://perma.cc/D49P-23GW.

20

H.I. Sutton, How Russian Spy Submarines Can Interfere with Undersea Internet Cables, FORBES (Aug. 19,
2020), https://perma.cc/5BXR-4CWT.

21

Yohei Hirose, Japan, US and Australia to Finance Undersea Cable for Palau, NIKKEI ASIA (Oct. 28, 2020),
https://perma.cc/2WXP-FH9D.

22

Marissa Alcala et al., Financing Subsea Cables in Latin America, NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT (June 16,
2020), https://perma.cc/QPG9-QKZW.

23

Sam Shead, Google Is Building a Huge Undersea Fiber-Optic Cable to Connect the U.S. to Britain and Spain,
CNBC (July 28, 2020), https://perma.cc/T3GE-N363.

24

See generally ISAAC GEISLER ET AL., DEP’T OF SYS. ENG’G & OPERATIONS RES., GEO. MASON UNIV.,
DESIGN OF A TRANSOCEANIC CABLE SYSTEM (2015), https://perma.cc/7WPB-HRPE.
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attempts.25 Third-party and private actors, however, are still considered a risk to
submarine cables. When four cables linking Europe and the Middle East were
simultaneously damaged, many officials and commercial operators alleged private
actors had cut the cables.26 Although more sophisticated technology is required to
hack a cable compared to destroying one, the threat of terrorists hacking a
submarine cable remains even if not manifest to date.27
In general, the process by which intelligence agencies tap into cables is highly
secretive. There are some indications, however, as to how it is done. Some reports
indicate states use specially designed submarines equipped with devices to splice
into cables. In this “splicing method,” the submarine, having broken through the
protective coating, installs listening devices within the fiber optic cable to collect
transmitted data.28 Some commentators, however, cast doubt on this method due
to the possibility of a cable operator detecting a break in data transmission through
the cable.29 Some reports nevertheless indicate the techniques are sophisticated
enough to not alert cable operators even when external damage to the cable is
already done.30 The possibility of damage to the cable or service interruption
through splicing is important in the global regulatory regime for cable protections,
as will be discussed at length in Section VI.
Other hacking methods appear less obtrusive. Some intelligence analysts
have speculated operators gain access to a cable at landing stations—stations fitted
with signal boosting equipment and cable access features—in order to install
intercept probes that capture the fiber optic light signal and make a copy of it. 31
This method, and a similar one involving creating a slight curvature within the
cable to siphon off data as it passes through the curve, may not alert an operator
that hacking has occurred because the cable does not witness a service interruption

25

Griffiths, supra note 16.

26

Investigators ultimately determined a ship’s anchor was to blame for at least one of four
simultaneously damaged cables connecting the Middle East and Europe, but many at the time
alleged the cables were damaged by private actors and conspiracy theories still abound. Lily Hay
Newman, Cut Undersea Cable Plunges Yemen Into Days-Long Internet Outage, WIRED (Jan. 13, 2020),
https://perma.cc/C4AF-CLBG; Kim Zetter, Undersea Cables Cut; 14 Countries Lose Web – Updated,
WIRED (Dec. 19, 2008), https://perma.cc/3TGK-EUHH.

27

MICHAEL SECHRIST, HARV. KENNEDY SCH. BELFER CTR., NEW THREATS, OLD TECHNOLOGY:
VULNERABILITIES IN UNDERSEA COMMUNICATIONS CABLE NETWORK MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS
(2012), https://perma.cc/953R-MSKW.
New Nuclear Sub Is Said to Have Special Eavesdropping Ability, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 20, 2005),
https://perma.cc/KDM9-683P.
See Tara M. Davenport, Submarine Cables, Cybersecurity & International Law: An Intersectional Analysis,
24 CATH. U. J.L. & TECH. 57, 103–5 (2015).
Meghan Neal, How to Hack the Backbone of the Internet, VICE (Oct. 31, 2013),
https://perma.cc/6MWG-CF3E.
See Khazan, supra note 13.

28

29

30

31
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seen in splicing.32 While these methods involve some damage to the cable, they
may not be easily identified or protected against even by wary states. Generally,
while the method used may differ, most methods involve some degree of damage
to the submarine cable and some degree of interference with a cable’s data
transmission.

III. T HE S HIFTING D IALOGUE A ROUND S UBMARINE C ABLE
H ACKING
This Section discusses why submarine cable hacking is a pressing and ripe
area for solutions within public international law. As noted above, most of the
world’s global powers, particularly the U.S., China, and Russia, enjoy the ability to
hack into one another’s cables and may want to reserve that ability. This may
indicate few states would be interested in developing norms or international public
law against submarine cable hacking. Indeed, the lack of a global convention
against peacetime hacking may signal a lack of state interest in curbing this
behavior. The ground, however, may be shifting.
First, the volume of information, and in turn sensitive information, that
passes through submarine cables is growing. Presently, submarine cables carry
95% of all international communications.33 As countries continue to develop and
as crises like COVID-19 require more work and entertainment to be done
remotely, global demand for internet bandwidth rises.34 In turn, submarine cable
use will only increase. Global consumer IP traffic is expected to rise from 212
Exabytes per month in 2020 to 333 Exabytes per month in 2022.35 Submarine
cable bandwidth and traffic are expected to rise by 40% by 2022.36 In 2020 alone,
global submarine cable bandwidth rose by 35%.37 Correspondingly, the submarine
cable market is expected to grow at approximately 11% by year from 2020 to 2025
increasing the market’s total value from $10.3 billion to $22 billion.38 The need for
cable protection then increases as the value and flow of data increases through
submarine cables.
32

Id.

33

Submarine Cables, NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN. (NOAA), https://perma.cc/2YKKDTS3.

34

Paul Brodsky, Let’s Just Say Demand Is Thriving in the Global Bandwidth Market, TELEGEOGRAPHY DIG.
(May 1, 2020), https://perma.cc/B245-M8FE.

35

Data Volume of Global Consumer IP Traffic From 2017 to 2022, STATISTA (Feb. 2019),
https://perma.cc/FY6S-NVT6.

36

Alex Vaxmonsky, New Subsea Cable Architectures Are Carrying the World’s Traffic, EQUINIX (Mar. 16,
2020), https://perma.cc/9GHL-WD9A.

37

Geoff Bennett, Subsea Cable Capacity: Where Do We Go Next?, SUBMARINE TELECOMS F. (Sept. 21,
2020), https://perma.cc/8P7K-NKJ3.

38

Submarine Cable System Market Worth $22.0 Billion by 2025, PR NEWSWIRE (Feb. 27, 2020),
https://perma.cc/7QTT-LM33.
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Second, while covert and secretive, state hacking and cyber operations only
appear to be increasing in scope and frequency. In 2013, leaks revealed the British
intelligence service the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ)
was tapping dozens of fiber optic cables processing over 600 million telephone
events and 21 Petabytes of data each day.39 In 2015, American and NATO security
forces became concerned with Russian submarines and spy ships increasingly
patrolling areas near American submarine cables.40 And the threat of Russian
activity has only increased. Russia has built out its submarine fleet,41 and a number
of these submarines are claimed to be equipped with cable hacking capabilities.42
This buildout of state capabilities to hack submarine cables has shifted states’
behavior with respect to submarine cables and hacking generally. Out of concern
of Chinese hacking attempts, as mentioned above, U.S. regulators prevented the
Pacific Light Cable Network connecting the U.S. and Hong Kong from going
live.43 This was seen as a dramatic move because Google and Facebook had
already spent over $300 million to construct the cable.44 In the commercial
context, the U.S. and China agreed in 2015 to halt government support for cyber
theft of corporate secrets or business information.45 In crafting the treaty, the U.S.
asserted the two countries would together seek “international rules of the road for
appropriate conduct in cyberspace” out of a growing concern around an arms race
in cyber operations and hacking.46 While not the same as submarine cable hacking,
the commercial hacking détente between China and the U.S. indicates some shift
in behavior around state-sponsored hacking. The international community may
be heading toward a similar watershed moment for crafting treaties around
submarine cable hacking given the buildout of state hacking capabilities.
Third, citizens and states are increasingly aware of hacking and intelligence
gathering conducted through submarine cables. Expressions of outrage against
these methods have increased accordingly. After Edward Snowden revealed the
extent of spying on U.S. citizens, thousands took to the streets to protest against
39
40

41

42

43

44

45

46

MacAskill et al., supra note 11.
David E. Sanger & Eric Schmitt, Russian Ships Near Data Cables Are Too Close for U.S. Comfort, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 25, 2015), https://perma.cc/WM9H-G9C6.
Xavier Vavasseur, Russia’s Pacific Fleet to Get 15 New Vessels in 2020, NAVAL NEWS (May 29, 2020),
https://perma.cc/39VS-4HZD.
Garrett Hinck, Evaluating the Russian Threat to Undersea Cables, LAWFARE (Mar. 5, 2018),
https://perma.cc/5RRD-PSX2.
Agence-France Presse, Pacific Data Cable Not Safe from China if Hong Kong Included, Says US, THE
GUARDIAN (June 17, 2020), https://perma.cc/HWY2-BLAB.
Mark Harris, Google and Facebook Turn Their Backs on Undersea Cable to China, TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 6,
2020), https://perma.cc/D3YQ-55H8.
David E. Sanger & Steven Lee Myers, After a Hiatus, China Accelerates Cyberspying Efforts to Obtain
U.S. Technology, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 29, 2018), https://perma.cc/KB46-K7SG.
Id.

268

Vol. 22 No. 1

Submarine Cable Hacking and Law of the Sea

Jason Petty

government surveillance.47 Human rights watch groups and the media continue to
monitor and critique civilian surveillance and spying efforts, and those criticisms
have only increased in recent years. The U.N. Human Rights Office of the High
Commissioner has produced annual reports related to the right to privacy in the
digital age and has advocated for greater recognition of the right to privacy against
broad surveillance.48 As citizens, NGOs, and political bodies increasingly advocate
for protections for the right to privacy, states will increasingly shift their behavior
to cooperating around greater privacy protections out of fear of losing the favor
of the electorate.
Fourth, cables are not capable of being monitored like other military or
commercial assets. Due to their length stretching hundreds of miles in the open
ocean and the number of cables traversing the sea, states would need to expend
unconscionable resources to patrol for surface ships and submarines that threaten
cables. While cable operators are able to observe real-time widespread disruptions
in data service, sophisticated hacking agents are supposedly able to splice into
submarine cables without alerting cable operators.49 To intercept cable hacking
operators, a state would then need a nearby ship, or perhaps even submarine,
capable of detecting and intercepting a hacking submarine. Indeed, it is difficult
to fathom the resources required to patrol the 5,000 or so miles from Los Angeles
to Tokyo across the Pacific for one cable let alone dozens of cables. Accordingly,
spying attempts on cables are likely to succeed. NATO and British intelligence
officers have acknowledged fears of Russian cable hacking in the Atlantic have
grown because states cannot constantly patrol for hacking attempts.50
Because states are unable to fully patrol against submarine hacking attempts,
states may want additional tools in their foreign policy toolbox to address possible
hacking attempts. As the danger posed by hacking grows and because the
resources required to patrol against hacking are so immense, states will need to
explore alternative means to protect cables and their sensitive data, which may
include recognizing liability for hacking. By recognizing grounds for liability
against submarine cable hacking, states can obtain a tool for enforcement against
rogue actors when the costs and benefits are in their favor.
47

48

49

50

Jim Newell, Thousands Gather in Washington for Anti-NSA ‘Stop Watching Us’ Rally, THE GUARDIAN
(Oct. 26, 2013), https://perma.cc/VWF5-AFSN.
The Right to Privacy in the Digital Age, U.N. HUM. RTS. OFF. HIGH COMM’R, https://perma.cc/PH43KGJY.
For attempts to solve this problem and a description of the technical requirements involved, see
Lijuan Zhao et al., On-Line Monitoring System of 110 kV Submarine Cable Based on BOTDR, 216
SENSORS & ACTUATORS 28 (2014); Ye Yincan et al., Submarine Cable Project Management and
Maintenance Monitoring Information System, in SUBMARINE OPTICAL CABLE ENGINEERING 259 (Ye
Yincan, Jiang Xinmin, Pan Guofu, Jiang Wei eds., 2018).
Could Russia Cut Undersea Communication Cables?, BBC (Dec. 15, 2017), https://perma.cc/XX957X7M.
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Fifth, while the U.S., China, and Russia, among others, may want to continue
participating in hacking operations, not all states participate in hacking and not all
states will want to continue to allow hacking to persist on the global stage.
Landlocked states and states with less robust submarine military presences do not
have the same incentives to allow submarine hacking to continue because they
cannot as easily participate. Further, these states may be incidentally damaged by
hacking attempts against U.S. or Russian submarine cables because their
information flows through those same cables to other states.51 These states may
then want protections against submarine hacking regardless of whether global
powers, like the U.S. and China, want the practice to continue.
The geopolitical landscape and incentives around protections against cable
hacking thus appear to be shifting. Accordingly, this Comment turns to
international public law as a potential way to curb hacking behavior. In the
following Section, this Comment examines the protections currently afforded to
cables under public international law. Subsequently, this Comment evaluates
current scholarly thought on solutions within the public international legal system
before proposing a novel solution to the problem of submarine cable hacking.

IV. I NTERNATIONAL L AWS R EGULATING S UBMARINE C ABLES
This Section offers an overview of the history of submarine cable
protections and an overview of current submarine cable protections in public
international law. The history of submarine cable protection offers strong insight
into how current protections were developed. By understanding how cable
protections changed over time, this Comment helps better understand the norms
around cables outside of the language of international conventions. Further, the
history of submarine cables can inform our understanding of the protections
dispute resolution bodies are willing to extend to cables when evaluating
international law.

A. The 1884 Convention for the Protection of Submarine
Telegraph Cables
International protections for submarine cables began, surprisingly enough,
in the 1880s with the dawn of undersea telegraph wires. Due to threats from
fishermen and pirates who accidentally or intentionally severed telegraph cables, 52
27 states joined together to create the 1884 Convention for the Protection of
51

52

Adam Satariano, How the Internet Travels Across Oceans¸ N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 10, 2019),
https://perma.cc/KVR3-WD5N.
For example, the first submarine cable crossing the English Channel was cut by a fisherman who
thought he discovered a new species of seaweed. Eric Wagner, Submarine Cables and Protections
Provided by the Law of the Sea, 19 MARINE POLICY 127, 128 (1995).
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Submarine Telegraph Cables.53 Principally, the 1884 Convention was designed to
protect cables against willful or negligent damage to cables that may interrupt or
obstruct telegraph signals.54
The 1884 Convention, however, was limited in scope and application. Rather
than develop a comprehensive international court to handle submarine cable
disputes or violations of the convention, the 1884 Convention required states to
create their own national regulations to protect submarine cables.55 Many
signatory states, such as Canada, never implemented national laws in accordance
with the Convention. Other participating states, like China, never signed the
Convention and similarly have not developed comprehensive domestic laws in
accordance with the Convention’s requirements.56 Where states did implement
domestic laws under their Convention obligations, those protections were
generally piecemeal and weak. For example, the U.S. enacted the 1888 Submarine
Cable Act57 in response to the 1884 Convention, but fines under the statute are so
small the U.S. Coast Guard does not pursue violators. There is not a single record
of a criminal charge under the statute and civil fines are capped at $5,000.58
The signing countries in 1884 could not have anticipated the emergence of
internet submarine cables or hacking into these cables to pilfer vital information.
The 1884 Convention, however, may offer some recourse for this sort of
misbehavior. Article II provides it is a punishable offense to “break or injure a
submarine cable, willfully or by culpable negligence, in such manner as might
interrupt or obstruct telegraphic communication.”59 Splicing or tapping into
submarine cables requires some damage to the cable and some degree of service
interruption to intercept transmitted data. Article II may then apply to submarine
cable hacking.
Nevertheless, the 1884 Convention may be limited in its protective ability.
First, the Convention requires states to implement domestic regimes protecting
cables. Because domestic jurisdiction over foreign nationals is limited, especially
on the high seas as will be discussed, these protections are limited in reach.
53

54

Convention for the Protection of Submarine Telegraph Cables, Mar. 14, 1884 [hereinafter 1884
Convention].
Id. art. II (“It is a punishable offence to break or injure a submarine cable, willfully or by culpable
negligence, in such manner as might interrupt or obstruct telegraphic communication, either wholly
or partially, such punishment being without prejudice to any civil action for damages.”).
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Id. art. XII (“The High Contracting Parties engage to take or to propose to their respective
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Further, because Article II is limited solely to “telegraphic wires,” it is not clear
whether damage to submarine internet cables portends liability under the
Convention. While many modern cables have the ability to transmit telegraphs,
most are fiber optic cables and therefore may be outside the convention’s scope.
And unlike subsequent conventions, the 1884 Convention did not create a tribunal
or dispute resolution body to handle these issues. States then are reliant on other
states’ domestic regulations for protecting submarine cables. Regardless of its
limited applicability to hacking, however, the 1884 Convention pioneered
protections for submarine cables, the spirt of which have since been largely
incorporated in modern treaties dealing with the high seas.

B. Intermediary Treaties and the U.N. Convention on the Law
of the Sea
Following the 1884 Convention, the international community incorporated
further protections for submarine cables in broader treaties related to the high
seas. In 1958, the Geneva Conventions on the Continental Shelf and the 1958
Convention on the High Seas incorporated portions of the 1884 Convention.
Namely, protections of cables from willful or culpably negligent damage and
indemnification obligations for other cable owners were incorporated in these
later conventions from the 1884 Convention.60
Notably, the 1958 High Seas Convention additionally codified the freedom
to lay cables as a high seas freedom, expanding the protections offered by the 1884
Convention.61 Specifically, Article II holds “the high seas being open to all nations,
no State may validly purport to subject any part of them to its sovereignty” and
the “freedom to lay submarine cables” is one such recognized right.62 Article
XXVI further affirms “States shall be entitled to lay submarine cables and
pipelines on the bed of the high seas.”63 This Convention also introduced more
limited rights on the continental shelf and territorial waters, a distinction to be
discussed at length.64 This Convention was the first to establish a general freedom
to lay submarine cables which has become central to modern treaty obligations
with respect to submarine cables.
Following these intermediary conventions, in 1982 the U.N. Convention on
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the contemporary convention for the law of the

60

See id. arts. II, IV, VII; see also Douglas Burnett, Tara Davenport & Robert Beckman, Overview of the
International Legal Regime, in SUBMARINE CABLES: THE HANDBOOK OF LAW AND POLICY 63, 71–72
(Douglas R. Burnett, Robert C. Beckman & Tara M. Davenport eds., 2014).
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Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 450 U.N.T.S. 82.
Id. art. II.
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sea, was created.65 UNCLOS was devised over extensive negotiations to replace
the 1958 conventions with a more comprehensive framework of laws and
obligations.66 Generally speaking, UNCLOS divides the seas into three sections,
each corresponding to distinct rights and duties of states: territorial seas, the
exclusive economic zones (EEZ) and continental shelves, and the high seas.
UNCLOS incorporated many of the same rights and duties with respect to
submarine cables as the 1884 Convention and the 1958 conventions. To
understand the rights of states under UNCLOS, this Comment will review states’
rights with respect to submarine cables in each of these three territorial zones.
A state’s territorial seas are the sea, including its bed and subsoil, for the area
up to 12 miles from a state’s shores.67 States maintain sovereignty over the
territorial sea and can impose their own laws over this area, including with respect
to submarine cables.68 If foreign actors break the coastal state’s laws in its
territorial waters, those actors would be subject to the coastal state’s jurisdiction
under UNCLOS. If a foreign state hacked into or damaged the coastal state’s
submarine cables within its territorial waters, those foreign hackers would be
subject to the coastal state’s laws against submarine cable hacking or damage to
submarine cables. For this reason, among others, states do not engage in hacking
in other states’ territorial waters. Even if they did, however, most states have not
crafted any protections or regulations on submarine cables within their territorial
waters.69 Where states have crafted protections for intentional or negligent damage
to cables, those protections are rarely enforced and are often quite weak.70
In the second zone, coastal states can claim the EEZ and continental shelf
up to 200 nautical miles past the borders of the state’s territorial seas.71 The
delimiting of the precise boundaries of this zone is somewhat complicated
however.72 Within this area, states enjoy certain rights to exploit natural resources
or explore.73 Regardless of these rights, other states maintain general rights to
65

66

67
68
69

70
71
72

73

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter
referred to as UNCLOS].
UNCLOS, INT’L UNION FOR CONSERVATION OF NATURE, https://perma.cc/K8ZT-2UXV. For
more information on the development of UNCLOS, see generally Myron H. Nordquist, et al.,
UNCLOS 1982 COMMENTARY (Myron H Nordquist et al. eds., 2012).
UNCLOS, supra note 65, art. II.
Id. art. XXI; Burnett et al., supra note 60, at 76.
Robert Beckman, Protecting Submarine Cables from Intentional Damage, in SUBMARINE CABLES: THE
HANDBOOK OF LAW AND POLICY 281, 287 (Douglas R. Burnett, Robert C. Beckman & Tara M.
Davenport eds., 2014).
Id at 287.
UNCLOS, supra note 65, art. LVII.
Id.. See generally Kenneth W. Swenson, A Stitch in Time: The Continental Shelf, Environmental Ethics, and
Federalism, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 851 (1987).
UNCLOS, supra note 65, art. LVI.
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“other internationally lawful uses of the seas related to those freedoms” which can
extend to submarine cables.74 UNCLOS also extends particular freedoms around
submarine cables including the ability to lay submarine cables and pipelines.75
While not explicitly mentioned, this freedom likely also includes the ability to
operate, repair, and inspect previously laid submarine cables.76
States, however, do not have unfettered access to the EEZ and the
continental shelf in the name of cable installation or repair. UNCLOS requires
states exercising these rights to “comply with the laws and regulations adopted by
the coastal State in accordance with the provisions of this Convention and other
rules of international law.”77 While this language is broad, this allowance permits
coastal states to restrict foreign states’ activities in furtherance of their right to
exploit natural resources in the EEZ or continental shelf or their right to explore
the area. In practice, however, this allowance is largely curtailed, and states broadly
enjoy States therefore broadly enjoy the freedom to lay submarine cables in the
EEZ.
UNCLOS provides similar protections for submarine cables in the EEZ as
in territorial waters, though jurisdiction is less clear. Again, similar to territorial
waters, while states are required to “adopt the laws and regulations necessary to
provide that the breaking or injury by a ship flying its flag or by a person subject
to its jurisdiction of a submarine cable beneath the high seas done willfully or
through culpable negligence… be a punishable offense,”78 most states have not
done so.79 Unlike territorial waters, however, coastal states’ regulations in the EEZ
or the continental shelf do not apply to foreign nationals who intentionally break
or damage cables.80 This means states in the EEZ and the continental shelf can
only hold their own citizens that injure cables liable under their domestic laws.
While some states have made novel legal arguments about submarine cables as
being in a protected zone of exploitation,81 the majority of states accept domestic
jurisdiction does not extend to cables in the EEZ.82 In the instance of hacking,
this would mean coastal states could only address domestic hackers, which, while

74

Id. art. LVIII.

75

Id. art. LXXXVIII.
See id. art. LXXIX (referring to the “laying or maintenance” of submarine cables and “repairing”
existing cables.”); see also Burnett et al., supra note 60, at 81.
UNCLOS, supra note 65, art. LVIII.
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Id. art. LXIII.
Beckman, supra note 69, at 288.
Id.
Zone to Protect Perth Submarine
https://perma.cc/R6RS-Q6G3.
Beckman, supra note 69, at 288.
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potentially useful for private actors, does not likely apply to the majority of
hacking incidents, which are largely committed by foreign governments.
The high seas are the third zone described by UNCLOS. The high seas are
defined as “all parts of the sea that are not included in the exclusive economic
zone, in the territorial sea or in the internal waters of a State, or in the archipelagic
waters of an archipelagic State.”83 The high seas are canonically regarded as
beyond the reach of states’ national jurisdiction.84 Accordingly, the high seas are
the largest sea area and do not offer any domestic protections against hacking
attempts.
The high seas, although beyond the reach of any state, are subject to
applicable international treaties including UNCLOS. Broadly, the high seas are
reserved for “peaceful purposes.”85 If hacking was considered an act of aggression,
states would not enjoy that freedom on the high seas. Similarly, acts considered
illegal under international treaties or conventions, like slave trading for example,
would not be a permissible use of the high seas. Presently, as discussed in Section
V, submarine cable hacking is considered a peaceful activity and not illegal under
any international convention.
UNCLOS does not offer many protections for submarine cables on the high
seas. Under UNCLOS, states maintain the freedom to lay submarine cables86 but
must exercise this freedom in recognition of other states’ exercise of high seas
freedoms.87 Similar to requirements for the EEZ, states are obligated under
UNCLOS to craft laws and regulations that require their citizens to compensate
cable owners for damage they caused to cables or pipelines.88 Many states have
not designed laws to meet this obligation and those that have generally involve
paltry compensatory payments.89 Again, like the EEZ, these regulations would not
extend to foreign nationals on the high seas under UNCLOS.
Unlike the 1884 Convention, UNCLOS included a dispute resolution
framework for conflicts between states. The International Tribunal for the Law
of the Sea (ITLOS) serves as a binding dispute resolution mechanism where states
are unable to reach a peaceful settlement. ITLOS has jurisdiction over “any
dispute concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention which is
submitted to it in accordance with this Part” including failing to comply with

83
84

85
86
87
88
89

UNCLOS, supra note 65, art. LXXXVI.
Id. art. LXXXIX (“No state may validly purport to subject any part of the high seas to its
sovereignty.”).
Id. art. LXXXVIII..
Id. art. CXII..
Id. art. LXXXVII.
UNCLOS, supra note 65, art. CXIII.
Beckman, supra note 69, at 288; see also Wagner, supra note 52, at 135.
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convention obligations.90 Where states have not implemented their treaty
obligations, ITLOS can compel states to specifically perform or craft regulations
under their UNCLOS requirements.
States are able to select ITLOS for the settlement of disputes at any time
through means of written declaration;91 however, states must fully exhaust
domestic remedies before applying for resolution through ITLOS.92 Therefore, if
a foreign state hacks into a state’s submarine cable in its territorial waters, the
injured state must seek liability under its domestic laws first where available.
ITLOS can apply the international law under UNCLOS or “other rules of
international law not incompatible with this Convention.”93 This extends to other
human rights treaties or accepted international conventions. Generally, ITLOS
handles cases involving foreign sailors held without cause,94 but the Tribunal has
exerted its jurisdiction over any number of maritime issues.95 As discussed in
Section VII, ITLOS may be a useful vehicle for arbitrating disputes between states
around submarine cable hacking and the international right to privacy.
Because UNCLOS does not offer explicit protections for cables from
hacking on the high seas, the puzzle then is how to create enforcement
mechanisms and norms against hacking. Because domestic jurisdiction can only
be asserted in territorial waters and most states do not have robust domestic laws,
trying to enforce cable protections through national laws seems impractical.
Indeed, as will be discussed, scholars have consistently decried the absence of
domestic protections for submarine cables. In the following Section, this
Comment will explore whether other conventions in international law, rather than
solely the laws of the sea, protect against submarine cable hacking. This Comment
then explores possible solutions to this problem of liability using ITLOS as a
possible avenue for liability.

90

91
92
93
94
95

UNCLOS, supra note 65, art. CCLXXXVII. See generally Tullio Treves, Human Rights and the Law of
the Sea, 28 BERKELEY J. INT’L. L. 1 (2010).
UNCLOS, supra note 65, art. CCLXXXVII.
Id. art. CCXCV.
Id. art. CCLXXXVIII.
List of Cases, INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE LAW OF THE SEA, https://perma.cc/ZW45-Y548.
For example, ITLOS adjudicated the maritime boundary between Mauritius and Maldives in the
Indian Ocean. See Dispute Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary Between Mauritius
and Maldives in the Indian Ocean (Mauritius v. Maldives), Case No. 28, Special Agreement and
Notification of 24 September 2019. In another case, ITLOS provided an advisory opinion for the
minimum access conditions and exploitation of fishery resources for the Sub-Regional Fisheries
Commission. See Request for Advisory Opinion Submitted by the Sub-Regional Fisheries
Commission, Advisory Opinion, 2 April 2015, ITLOS Reports 2015, Case No. 21.
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V. I NTERNATIONAL N ORMS W ITH R ESPEC T TO H ACKING
This Section describes the international conventions and framework with
respect to cyber operations and hacking. Generally, hacking and cyber surveillance
are regarded as peacetime activities and are not limited by any international treaties
or conventions. The methods employed in pursuit of these goals, however, may
be deemed problematic by various conventions. This Section explores the limits
of hacking techniques and cyber surveillance and discusses how shifting norms
around the right to privacy may change international consensus on the viability of
some surveillance tactics.
At present, there is no international framework for hacking offenses or cyber
operations. While previous conventions like the Budapest Convention on
Cybercrime96 tried to harmonize national laws with respect to cyber operations
and provide for mutual assistance in investigating and prosecuting cyber
operations,97 there is no international legal framework for cyber offenses or
hacking.98
In response to lacking a global framework, a group of preeminent
international law scholars and practitioners created the Tallinn Manual99 to
describe the legal norms and regulations around cyber operations and hacking. 100
The Tallinn Manual is not an international convention and is not binding. Rather,
the document serves as an expression of opinion of various experts versed in these
topics. Accordingly, it should be considered a reflection of the law at the time of
writing and not a limiting or normative statement of the law. The Tallinn Manual
is also limited in scope and incorporates public, but not private or domestic,
international law.101 The document, however, can provide a general insight into
how the international community views current restrictions on cyber operations
on the high seas and whether hacking is indeed a “peaceful use” of international
waters.

A. General Cyber Operations on the High Seas
According to the Tallinn Manual, the primary basis for liability for cyber
activities is territorial. Much like a state has jurisdiction over damage to cables in
96

Convention on Cybercrime, Nov. 23, 2001, E.T.S. No. 185.

97

Amalie M. Weber, The Council of Europe’s Convention on Cybercrime, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 425, 426–
30 (2003).

98

Id. at 428–30.
NATO COOPERATIVE CYBER DEF. CTR. OF EXCELLENCE, TALLINN MANUAL 2.0 ON THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER OPERATIONS (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2d ed. 2017)
[hereinafter TALLINN MANUAL].
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100
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Id. at 2.
Id. at 4.
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its territorial seas, states have jurisdiction over cyber activities or hacking that
occur within their territory or their territorial waters.102 The experts note tapping
a state’s submarine cables in its territorial waters violated its sovereignty.103 States
then have jurisdiction over hacking attempts within their territorial waters.
Tapping or hacking activities outside of a state’s territorial waters do not
offer the same legal recourse. Like cable damage under UNCLOS, the EEZ and
the continental shelf is subject to a complicated legal framework for cyber
operations jurisdiction. Generally, if cyber operations are carried out for “peaceful
purposes” and maintain “due regard to that State’s rights and duties in the zone,”
they are permitted in the EEZ.104 And so long as these operations do not violate
“other international legal norms… governing the circumstances,” they do not
constitute a violation of state sovereignty in the EEZ.105 Hacking therefore in the
EEZ, when it does not violate other international legal norms, is permissible.
On the high seas, states have even fewer rights or protections against
hacking. Cable hacking attempts on the high seas do not constitute a violation of
the hacked state’s sovereignty.106 Indeed, background intelligence gathering on the
high seas during peacetime has long been considered legal without much debate
in the international community.107 While hacking or tapping constitute more
invasive techniques than radio or sonar surveillance, which have both been long
accepted, most scholars believe there is no difference by conducting more “active”
intelligence gathering via hacking.108 As in the EEZ, however, human rights
violations that occur during cyber operations on the high seas are not permissible
according to the Tallinn Manual.
As typified by the above, norms around cyber operations have either not
solidified or are highly permissive of cyber operations on the high seas. Because
these norms are absent, there is insufficient state practice and public international

102
103
104

105

Id. at 51.
Id. at 257.
Id. at 233 (“In particular, employing a submarine or unmanned underwater vehicle to tap in
territorial or archipelagic waters is inconsistent with the navigational regime of innocent passage as
submarines are required to transit on the surface.”)
Id. at 257.
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See Oliver J. Lissitzyn & Charles H. Stockton, Electronic Reconnaissance From the High Seas and
International Law, 22 NAVAL WAR COLL. REV. 26, 28 (1970).
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See, e.g., Roger D. Scott, Territorially Intrusive Intelligence Collection and International Law, 46 A.F. L. REV.
217, 219 (1999). See also Davenport, supra note 29, at 105.
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TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 99 at 257. But see Davenport, supra note 29, at 105 (“Whether
UNCLOS can be used to address the mass surveillance carried out through the tapping of undersea
cables is not entirely clear . . . Such surveillance does not fall within conventional perceptions of
military activities/intelligence gathering at sea, which as mentioned above, is targeted, and aims at
enhancing knowledge of the marine environment and/or the military capabilities of other State’s
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law to conclude cyber espionage is per se banned.109 Experts, however, agree that
cyber operations or hacking may be carried out in a manner that is unlawful. 110
Accordingly, this Comment turns to the consequences of hacking and review
whether or not these effects may constitute some form of illegal or prohibited
activity under public international law.

B. Incidental Effects of Submarine Cable Hacking: Cable
Damage
One incidental effect of submarine cable hacking is damage to the submarine
cables as a result of splicing into the cable or damaging the cable in the installation
of surveillance devices. As noted above, UNCLOS mandates states craft laws to
hold their citizens liable for intentional or negligent damage to submarine cables.
These laws, however, are limited in jurisdiction to territorial waters. Experts
notably have split as to whether the mere act of tapping cables that results in
damage renders it a violation of public international law regardless of location.111
The majority of experts agreed states engage in these activities at their own risk
and can incur liability for incidental damage. Separately, a handful of experts
argued that unforeseeable damage from tapping operations would not incur
liability. These experts note there is no settled case law as to whether incidental
damage from cyber operations would be deemed foreseeable or intentional.112
This question of liability for damage is nonetheless important. By being able
to hold foreign states liable for damage incurred as a result of hacking, states can
shift the cost-benefit calculus of hacking attempts by requesting damages. While
this may not wholly eliminate submarine cable hacking, potential liability for
damage may reduce overall hacking activity levels. It typically costs millions of
dollars to repair damage to the actual cable.113 The economic costs associated with
a down cable are hard to estimate but the losses can be extraordinary. Somalia lost
internet access for three weeks due to cable damage at a cost of $130 million. 114
Even without a total internet outage, increased bandwidth demand and slower
data speed as a result of cable interference can wreak huge productivity losses. If
a state was held liable for repair costs, or lost productivity, the possible costs

109

TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 99, at 169.

110

Id. at 170.
Id. at 257.

111
112
113

114

Id.
For example, a cable fault in the Pacific in 2007 cost $8 million to repair the cable. Michael Matis,
The Protection of Undersea Cables: A Global Security Threat, U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE (2012),
https://perma.cc/34Y8-VLX3.
The Economic Impact of Submarine Cable Outages Can Still be Enormous, SUBCABLE WORLD (Aug. 21,
2017), https://perma.cc/TF2F-QQ7R.
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associated with hacking would rise and overall hacking activity levels may fall in
turn.

C. Incidental Effects of Submarine Cable Hacking: Violations
of the International Right to Privacy
A second incidental effect of submarine cable hacking is the violation of
citizens’ privacy by harvesting electronic data. Because hacking operators cannot
control what data they siphon off, hackers will inevitably intercept citizens’ private
communications and data in their operations, unless the cable is a dedicated
military cable. This violation of privacy is significant because, as the Tallinn
Manual experts noted, cyber operations may not be conducted in an unlawful
manner.115 While controversial, the international right to privacy would likely be
violated by these operations. Accordingly, this Comment next reviews the
international right to privacy, its implications for submarine hacking, and the
debate around its scope.
A number of conventions have enumerated an international right to
privacy.116 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights introduced this principle
in Article 12 that “no one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his
privacy, family, home or correspondence.”117 The International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR) enumerated this right in Article 17 that “no one shall
be subject to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or
correspondence.”118 At its core, this right protects a “private sphere” of
autonomous liberty and development that cannot be intruded on without
permission by state actors, individuals, or corporations.119 This right has been
extended to include protection of personal communications and data.120 The
scope of this right is clear for intelligence gathering or hacking within the territory
of a state. Any arbitrary electronic interception that takes place within a nation’s
borders or involves that nation’s citizens violates the international right to
privacy.121
115

TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 99, at 170.
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Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Dec. 12, 1948, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. Doc. A/810 art. 12;
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The scope of this right is less clear for intelligence gathering on foreign states
or foreign nationals. The U.S. has presented the most limited interpretation of the
right to privacy in this context. According to the U.S., the right only attaches to
citizens within a state’s territory and subject to its jurisdiction.122 Therefore,
foreigners and citizens located abroad do not enjoy the right to privacy for U.S.
surveillance activities. In the context of U.S. submarine cable hacking, this implies
only U.S. citizens enjoy the right to privacy, and they only enjoy this right for
submarine cable hacking conducted in the U.S.’s territorial waters. The majority
of states in the international community hold the right is broader. According to
the majority opinion, states “respect and ensure the rights laid down in the
Covenant to anyone within the power or effective control of that State Party, even
if not situated within the territory of the State Party.”123 While the precise contours
of the ICCPR are still debated, a number of international bodies have coalesced
around the principle that a state’s obligations are maintained for foreigners and
citizens alike.124 Under this interpretation, citizens enjoy the right to privacy for
submarine cable hacking regardless of where the hacking takes place or what state
conducts the hacking.
The debate around the scope of this right centers on whether a state
exercises “effective control” over a person or territory in determining jurisdiction.
As discussed earlier, the high seas are beyond the territorial reach of any particular
state. Therefore, questions of “effective control” become more pressing as
scholars consider whether a state exercises effective control over cyberspace
through cables located on the high seas. This question is hotly debated. Some
scholars have noted limiting effective control to solely physical territory may result
in illogical results as it is not clear where cyber communications are physically
located when conducted over the internet.125 Other scholars have argued a “virtual
control,” where states are liable for those citizens whose communications it has
control over, is more appropriate.126 In the context of submarine cables, this may
be a more appropriate approach as it would ensure the equal treatment of
individuals regardless of physical location, which matches the traversing and
multi-state nature of submarine cables.
An international right to privacy nevertheless remains controversial. Some
scholars insist an application of a universal right to privacy may undermine

122

Bignami, supra note 119, at 4.

123
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domestic protections against surveillance currently in place.127 These scholars
argue a more universal definition may reduce the obligations afforded domestic
citizens under current cyber privacy laws.128 Other scholars have argued the right
to privacy is socially defined and therefore changes from context to context or
society to society.129 Accordingly, the scope of the right at issue may not extend
to protections against state surveillance for defense purposes depending on the
social definition and context.
Regardless of the ongoing debate, the recognition and scope of the right to
privacy appears to be shifting, as discussed in Section III, toward a greater
recognition of the right to privacy. Scholars have noted international human rights
cases increasingly find states’ human rights obligations follow them in acting
abroad.130 As this recognition expands, mass surveillance is increasingly
considered “arbitrary” and in contravention of the ICCPR.131 In a 2015
groundbreaking case, ten U.K. NGOs filed an action with the European Court of
Human Rights (ECtHR) arguing the U.K.’s mass surveillance system violated the
right to privacy.132 The ECtHR agreed noting the surveillance scheme’s arbitrary
intelligence collection violated the right to privacy under the European
Convention on Human Rights.133 This case is significant because it specifically
addressed bulk surveillance conducted through fiber optic cables.134 On appeal,
the ECtHR dismissed the case for failing to seek appropriate domestic remedies.135
Nevertheless, the court’s initial ruling reflects a concerted shift in behavior toward
greater privacy rights recognition. Similarly, in 2020, the Court of Justice of the
European Union (CJEU) held indiscriminate government mass surveillance

127
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violated E.U. regulations for privacy and data protection.136 The CJEU held
surveillance should be conducted only for what is strictly necessary for national
security purposes.137 These shifts are representative of general shifts in recognition
of the right to privacy.
While cooperation for developing protections and harmonization of
definitions for privacy in the internet age is ongoing,138 it is apparent that the right
to privacy exists and is increasingly recognized in international public law. While
this Comment cannot cure all the debates around the right to privacy, the solution
described in Section VII provides a novel exploration of the right to privacy in
cyber space that may help advance discussions elsewhere.

VI. T HE L AY OF THE L AND OF C URRENT S CHOLARSHIP
This Section explores current scholarship on submarine cable protections
and submarine cable hacking. This Section serves to provide context for the
novelty of the solution offered in Section VII and discuss how scholars interpret
currently proposed avenues for liability for submarine hacking. Scholars currently
focus on protections for incidental or intentional damage to cables in order to
raise the relative costs associated with hacking. Scholars, however, are pessimistic
about current domestic protections toward submarine cables and generally accept
submarine cable hacking as part of the international landscape. Notably, scholars
have previously not used the right to privacy to frame the debate around
submarine cable hacking and have not used dispute resolution mechanisms, like
ITLOS, for resolving these issues.
As a summary of prior Sections, UNCLOS does not explicitly place
restrictions on peacetime intelligence gathering or cyber operations on the high
seas or in the EEZ. Because the high seas are not subject to any state’s domestic
jurisdiction and the EEZ is subject to very limited jurisdiction, domestic laws
against hacking or damage to submarine cables do not apply in these areas.
Further, there is no international treaty or convention that restricts or bans cyber
operations generally. Experts agree that “the bottom line is that there is no clear
prohibition against the physical tapping of fiber optic cables in the EEZ [or the
high seas] to be found in UNCLOS”139 or other international treaties.140
While states generally have the freedom to conduct cyber operations on the
high seas, if the method of those operations violates other international treaties or
136
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laws, those methods are subject to liability.141 Scholars have therefore turned to
UNCLOS Article 112 and Article 113, which describe the freedom to lay
submarine cables and the obligation of states to create domestic protections for
cables, as possible protections for cables.142 In their analyses, these scholars focus
on incidental damage to submarine cables, the first indirect effect from cable
hacking.
Scholars, however, are pessimistic about using Article 112 or Article 113 to
protect submarine cables. While UNCLOS requires states to have domestic laws
to punish intentional or negligent damage of undersea cables, most states have not
imposed these regulations. For example, Canada does not have any legal
protections for cables once laid.143 While Canadian law requires permits to lay
cables and conduct periodic environmental impact reports, cable companies do
not have any legal recourse under Canadian law for cables damaged by other
parties. The U.N. General Assembly has even called on states to implement
protections under Article 113 due to the paucity of available domestic protections
against damage to cables.144
And where states do have regulations, those protections are generally weak
and rarely enforced. For example, U.S. federal law states parties who intentionally
damage cables are subject to a maximum fine of $5,000.145 Repair costs far exceed
this figure.146 Other states similarly have weak enforcement regimes. In Australia,
the penalty for intentional damage of submarine cables is AUS$2,000 or
imprisonment for 12 months while the penalty for negligent damage is AUS$1,000
or imprisonment for 3 months.147 With such insignificant protections, there are
few incentives for cable owners or regulators to seek enforcement. Accordingly,
there are no documented instances of prosecution under either the U.S. or
Australian laws.

141
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Scholars and advocates have argued strengthening these domestic
protections may offer some relief against hacking. As discussed in the previous
Section, by increasing the costs associated with a hacking operation, the associated
cost-benefit analysis shifts. Scholars have focused on increasing these protections
in the absence of a new international framework against hacking. Tara Davenport
noted Article 113 of UNCLOS would apply to damage done through cable
tapping but that domestic protections against submarine cable damage are
“woefully inadequate” and “not commensurate with the damage resulting from
intentional interference.”148 Zoe Scanlon likewise recognized despite the
“assumption underpinning UNCLOS that coastal states would recognize their
clear interest in protecting submarine cables,” most states have not enacted
legislation protecting cables.149 This contributes to an ineffective legal regime
against cable damage and hacking.
While there is some appetite for bolstering domestic protections,150 doing so
is an incomplete solution. First, the associated penalties would have to be severe
in order to change the calculus of hacking states and compensate the injured cable
owners. High penalties, however, may result in expensive liability for negligent,
non-hacking agents like ship owners who incidentally drop anchor on a cable—
the most common cable injury.151 High penalties may also incentivize states to
cheat by refusing to pay damages or prosecute their citizens. Further, these
domestic regulations could only assert jurisdiction over the citizens and ships of
the regulating state or in offenses committed in its territorial waters. While hacking
is easiest closest to land,152 the activities at issue most often do not occur in
territorial waters and most commonly involve foreign actors or states as discussed
in Section II.
Scholars, in recognition of these weaknesses, have generally accepted
submarine cable hacking as part of the international landscape until further
protections can be crafted or norms around cyber operations crystallize against
mass surveillance.153 Scholars, however, have overlooked the second indirect
effect of cyber operations on submarine cables: privacy violations. The following
section offers a novel solution to the problem of submarine cable hacking by
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combining the dispute resolution framework under UNCLOS with other sources
of public international law using privacy as grounds for liability.

VII. U SING ITLOS TO T RIGGER D ISPUTE R E SOLUTION :
D AMAGE AND P RIVACY S OLUTIONS FOR H ACKING
This Section describes the novel solution offered by this Comment with
respect to submarine cable hacking. The Section first describes how the binding
dispute resolution system under the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea
(ITLOS) likely has jurisdiction over submarine hacking attempts. This Section
further argues, contrary to prior scholarly work, the lack of domestic protections
for submarine cable hacking benefits the creation of international norms and a
regime against cable hacking. This Section then proposes two solutions using
ITLOS. First, ITLOS can be used to create an international regime protecting
against submarine cable damage. This in turn raises the costs of submarine cable
hacking and may lower hacking activity levels. Second, ITLOS can serve as a
forum to argue hacking violates the international right to privacy and therefore
should not be permitted even on the high seas. This analysis of the right to privacy
with respect to submarine cables is novel in current scholarship and contributes
to the ongoing debate about the limits of bulk surveillance collection and
surveillance protections generally.

A. Jurisdiction Under ITLOS
As a preliminary matter, ITLOS likely has jurisdiction over alleged
submarine hacking disputes. As referenced above, under UNCLOS, ITLOS
serves as a dispute resolution mechanism between states. The jurisdiction of
ITLOS is broad, encompassing “all disputes and all applications submitted to it in
accordance with [UNCLOS].”154 To confer jurisdiction, therefore, states must
have a viable link between hacking attempts and UNCLOS.
Under UNCLOS Articles 112 and 113, states have two arguments as to why
ITLOS has jurisdiction over submarine cable hacking. First, states can use ITLOS
for dispute resolution where other states are not abiding by their obligations to
UNCLOS. Article 113 provides states must adopt laws and regulations to punish
“breaking or injury” of submarine cables on the high seas “in such a manner as to
be liable to interrupt or obstruct telegraphic or telephonic communications.”155
States therefore must create domestic liability schemes to hold its citizens liable
for damage to or interruption of submarine cables on the high seas. If, for
example, a state has not met its UNCLOS Article 113 obligations to have domestic
154
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regulations and a foreign state’s cable is damaged, the foreign state can invoke
ITLOS to determine the breaching state’s cable liability. Generally, disputes
between states about how to handle cable damage would sufficiently link to
UNCLOS to confer jurisdiction.156
Second, states can present arguments that protections for cables under
UNCLOS are broader than the right to merely lay cables. Article 112 codifies the
right for all states “to lay submarine cables and pipelines on the bed of the high
seas beyond the continental shelf.”157 While not stated, it can be assumed states
have the freedom to operate these cables on the high seas. If a foreign state were
to violate this assumed right of operation, through hacking or cable signal
disruption, an injured state may then have grounds for liability under UNCLOS.
ITLOS would be a suitable body to address the violation of this right because the
tribunal adjudicates the rights and responsibilities of states on the high seas.
Even if Articles 112 and 113 are not compelling enough to justify
jurisdiction, ITLOS also has jurisdiction over “any dispute concerning the
interpretation or application of an international agreement related to the purposes
of [UNCLOS].”158 This broad language allows ITLOS to exert jurisdiction over
any international treaty that affects or interacts with UNCLOS. While broad,
ITLOS usually declines, however, jurisdiction absent some connection to the high
seas or a subject matter of UNCLOS. Scholars have noted the specialized nature
of ITLOS means the “subject matter of any agreement providing for jurisdiction
of ITLOS would probably relate closely to the law of the sea, given the expertise
of the judges of ITLOS.”159
For example, in a case involving detained sailors, ITLOS asserted
international human rights under other international conventions were at issue.
Plaintiffs, however, had to first assert a jurisdictional link to these rights by noting
that the detention that led to these violations was sanctioned under UNCLOS.160
Similarly, Italy invoked the ICCPR in its complaint to ITLOS to free Italian sailors
detained by the Indian government. Italy did not invoke a stand-alone argument
for release under the ICCPR but rather paired it with UNCLOS provisions against
“prejudice.”161 States can similarly invoke ITLOS to clarify the obligations of states
to the international right to privacy, as articulated by a number of international
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conventions, with respect to UNCLOS. States should then be able to obtain
ITLOS jurisdiction under this more general human rights framework.
Before reaching these questions of ITLOS jurisdiction, however, ITLOS
may only resolve disputes under UNCLOS “after local remedies have been
exhausted where this is required by international law.”162 Subsequently, states
subject to hacking must have exhausted domestic remedies before looking to
ITLOS. As mentioned above, scholars have frequently noted the paucity of
domestic regulations against submarine cable hacking. Many states have not
implemented any domestic regulations concerning submarine cable damage, let
alone hacking.163 And where those domestic protections do exist, they are often
weak relative to the potential damage done by hacking attempts to a cable’s
constitution.164 Because domestic protections are not typically available or are
insufficient where they are available, states have generally exhausted all domestic
remedies.165
And while scholars have criticized the weakness of these domestic
protections and frequently recommended instituting stronger domestic
regulations, the absence of these regulations actually strengthens the argument for
jurisdiction under ITLOS. If domestic regulations were available, states would be
obligated to pursue liability under those regulations. Because states have not
implemented these regulations or have incredibly weak domestic protections, this
domestic remedy is likely not available.166 Because states have therefore not
complied with their requirements under UNCLOS, ITLOS has a strong case for
jurisdiction as the appropriate body to handle disputes associated with these
unfulfilled obligations. In this respect, the overwhelming weakness of domestic
protections actually benefits states in arguing for jurisdiction before ITLOS. This
observation is in contravention to scholars’ criticism of domestic cable
protections.167
Once jurisdiction has been established, states can then turn to the two
indirect effects of hacking—cable damage and violations of the right to privacy—
to seek liability against hacking states.

162
163
164
165

166
167

UNCLOS, supra note 65, art. CCLXXXXV.
Coffen-Smout & Herbert, supra note 143, at 444.
Id.; Davenport, supra note 29, at 84.
There is some question as to whether weak enforcement regimes, as in Australia or the United
States, would be sufficient to evade ITLOS jurisdiction. States, however, can likely still obtain
jurisdiction over this question.
Davenport, supra note 29, at 106.
Id. at 84, 106.

288

Vol. 22 No. 1

Submarine Cable Hacking and Law of the Sea

Jason Petty

B. Using ITLOS to Protect Against Cable Damage
States can use ITLOS to protect against hacking by enforcing liability for
damages incurred from hacking. Using Articles 112 and 113 of UNCLOS, injured
states can argue the offending states are not abiding by their UNCLOS
requirements to create a domestic regime to punish cable damagers. Injured states
can further argue offending states violate the freedom to lay and operate
submarine cables. In the first instance, an injured state may use ITLOS to force
the offending state to punish its wrongdoers under its own domestic jurisdiction.
ITLOS can bind states to craft and administer regimes protecting cables against
damage by their citizens. This may in turn increase prospective economic costs of
hacking and reduce overall hacking activity levels. While states may have an
incentive to cheat, the political costs from breaking with its required enforcement
regime will only increase under a binding dispute resolution order from ITLOS.
States can further argue domestic protections as required under UNCLOS
may not wholly protect this articulated right. If the cost of damage to cables is so
expensive168 and the economic value of internet access is so great,169 states can
argue the domestic regimes formulated and required under UNCLOS may not
adequately protect their rights to be free from damage or interference.
Accordingly, states may argue ITLOS should assert some damages or
compensation requirement for intentional damage to cables from hacking.
In the second instance, states may argue the freedom to lay and operate
cables under UNCLOS extends to protections against interference by foreign
states on the high seas. While UNCLOS only protects against “damage” to
cables,170 states can reasonably argue the UNCLOS protections are an outgrowth
of a history of protecting general use and operation of cables. Because the 1884
Convention protected against interference of cable operation, which was
subsequently codified in the intervening conventions, states can reasonably claim
UNCLOS’s more general cable freedoms extend to freedom from arbitrary
interference by foreign states. Because hacking interferes with a cable’s signal and
likely requires repair by the operator, states can then argue hacking falls under this
sphere of prohibited activities.
ITLOS would likely be receptive to this argument. ITLOS has a history of
extending greater protections to states than is precisely articulated in the language
of UNCLOS. In MV/Saiga, ITLOS held Guinea violated the prohibition against
the excessive use of force in detaining ships, although prohibitions against the
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excessive use of force are not expressly articulated by UNCLOS.171 And in Guyana
v. Suriname, ITLOS held Suriname used unlawful force against a Canadian vessel
licensed by Guyana even without a prohibition on the use of force against foreign
vessels under UNCLOS.172 These cases indicate ITLOS’s willingness to extend
more general international law protections beyond UNCLOS. These cases further
demonstrate ITLOS is willing to extend protections to states beyond the text of
UNCLOS using the history and subtext of the treaty. Accordingly, ITLOS may
be receptive to the argument that freedom from damage or interference has long
been historically recognized.
This solution is novel as it resolves the lack of enforcement mechanism
scholars criticized by scholars with respect to domestic cable regimes. Because
ITLOS can require states to abide by their treaty obligations, ITLOS can then
mandate states create domestic regulations to protect cables. Further, this solution
allows ITLOS to hear arguments about more general freedoms related to
submarine cable use. Because ITLOS can hear arguments related to other binding
treaties and agreements,173 states can argue the 1884 Convention or intervening
law of the sea conventions established the freedom to lay and operate cables
includes freedom from unnecessary cable interference.
This solution carries with it a handful of potential caveats. First, ITLOS will
most likely require the offending country to hold violators domestically liable. This
follows because Articles 112 and 113 of UNCLOS only require a domestic cable
protection scheme. The offending country is likely to impose minimal penalties
or elect not to impose penalties. This strategy may then not raise costs associated
with hacking to lower overall activity levels. This outcome, however, does not
fully undermine the solution described above. If countries’ domestic regimes
continue to be weak or weakly enforced, ITLOS is more likely to extend greater
protections to cables than are required under UNCLOS. This would be similar to
the extension of greater rights than necessary in Guyana v. Suriname.174 Further,
continued refusal to hold violators domestically liable will cause ITLOS to hold
contravening states accountable for failing to uphold their UNCLOS
responsibilities. This may in turn increase the costs associated with hacking and
lower activity levels.
Second, arguments about more general rights to cable protections, such as
the freedom of cable operation, may be weak because not many states signed onto
the 1884 Convention or the intervening conventions of the laws of the sea.
Without a convention to point to, ITLOS would then be relying on general norms
171
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of international law in creating a liability regime for cable damage. ITLOS may be
reticent to do that for fear of overstepping its bounds and of countries not
participating in dispute resolution. Once such refusal occurred in Arctic Sunrise
when Russia refused to appear in front of ITLOS.175
Third, not all hacking attempts end in damage to submarine cables. If a cable
was not damaged during a hacking attempt, this regime may not apply.
Accordingly, states must turn to other norms or rights to protect against
submarine hacking. The following Section presents a solution to submarine cable
hacking that centers on the right to privacy and does not rely on damage to the
underlying cable to provide liability.

C. Using ITLOS to Protect Against Violations of the Right to
Privacy
States can also use ITLOS to pursue violations to the international right to
privacy committed by hacking. ITLOS is able to apply UNCLOS law and “other
rules of international law not incompatible with” UNCLOS including the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the ICCPR.176 States subject to
hacking can use these conventions and other international human rights to argue
against hacking once they have jurisdiction under ITLOS.
States can argue hacking contravenes the right to privacy embedded in
numerous human rights treaties. As discussed in Section V, citizens enjoy a right
to privacy under many international conventions. ITLOS can enforce violations
of the ICCPR and other treaties as they relate to the right to privacy. While
submarine cable hackers may be attempting to access sensitive government
information, the hacking of undersea cables almost inevitably includes access to
private citizens’ internet traffic because states cannot pick and choose what
information they obtain.177 Such a broad sweeping may therefore be considered
“arbitrary” and in contravention of the international right to privacy.
While litigation around the right to privacy is relatively new, there is a trend
among international bodies toward recognizing a universal right to privacy. As
discussed in Section V, the ECtHR previously held the U.K.’s bulk surveillance
program through fiber optic cables violated the right to privacy but subsequently
dismissed the case on appeal for failure to pursue all domestic remedies.178 In
October 2020, the CJEU held indiscriminate mass surveillance violated E.U.
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privacy and data protections.179 And the German Constitutional Court held
Germany’s constitutional protections against indiscriminate surveillance and data
collection extended to foreigners living abroad.180 Beyond these court rulings, the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) has affirmed the rights under the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and the ICCPR apply globally.181 And while the ICJ
has not affirmed a right to privacy against all indiscriminate surveillance, the Court
did not denounce such an argument in two prior cases involving surveillance on
private communications.182 This matches a trend in international bodies toward
greater recognition of the right to privacy in recent years.183
Rights under the ICCPR and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
have previously been protected by ITLOS. 184 While ITLOS has not taken on cases
involving privacy, ITLOS precedent indicates a keen and demonstrated interest in
protecting other human rights outside of those codified by UNCLOS. For
example, ITLOS in its 1999 MV Saiga Nr. 2 judgment,185 for a case involving
seized vessels, referred to “considerations of humanity” that “must apply to the
Law of the Sea as they do in other areas of international law.”186 The ITLOS
decisions in Arctic Sunrise and Enrica Lexie further indicate an increasing willingness
by ITLOS to consider human rights concerns, either implicitly in the case of Enrica
Lexie or explicitly as in Arctic Sunrise.187
These cases demonstrate “a pattern of increased willingness on the part of
States to invoke (universal) human rights instruments (i.e., the ICCPR)—and, in
this case, even the views of human rights bodies (i.e., the Human Rights
Committee) — in provisional measures proceedings before ITLOS.”188 Scholars
have observed ITLOS increasingly incorporates “considerations of humanity” in
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its decision-making.189 And, as discussed in Section V, the international right to
privacy would fall into such considerations.
ITLOS is further likely to invoke the right to privacy under the ICCPR or
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights because privacy is so closely linked to
the subject of the proceeding on the merits. ITLOS requires “the relief sought
(and the rights to be protected by the relief) must be closely related to the rights
subject to the proceedings on the merits.”190 The freedom to lay cables under
UNCLOS impugns some respect for those cables, their use, and their content.
Because hacking violates the use and content of these cables, the right to privacy
seems closely associated with hacking and capable of being invoked in
proceedings.
This solution is novel for a handful of reasons. First, this solution uses a
supposed weakness in international protections for submarine cables—lack of
domestic protections— as the jurisdictional hook for liability. Although scholars
have critiqued the weakness of these regimes,191 the lack of an effective or a largely
weak framework is actually a strength in creating a secondary method to pursue
violators. Further, if domestic protections were stronger, ITLOS complaints may
be superseded by domestic and local remedies. Because domestic remedies are
limited in application and minimal at best, the dispute resolution system offered
by ITLOS has broader application and ability to impose necessary penalties.
Second, this solution avoids questions of the peacetime legitimacy of state
intelligence gathering more generally. As discussed in the Tallinn Manual, cyber
operations may not be conducted in an unlawful manner.192 If submarine cable
hacking is considered a violation of the international right to privacy, this
particular method of collecting surveillance would be deemed unlawful. States still
preserve the ability to gather intelligence or surveillance through other, less
arbitrary, means. This solution is therefore more tailored than other debates
around peacetime intelligence gathering writ large.
While a novel method of solution, the use of ITLOS to make claims against
the international right to privacy is not without caveats. While the caveats
discussed below are not fatal to the solution described, they do present questions
about the potential scope of the solution asserted and how controversies around
the international right to privacy and international legal obligations generally bleed
into the conversation around submarine cables.
189
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First, not all states are signatories to UNCLOS or the human rights
conventions that describe the international right to privacy. Prominently, for
example, the U.S. has not ratified its participation in UNCLOS, although it is a
signatory.193 While making some claims against other states under UNCLOS, it is
not clear the U.S. can invoke UNCLOS or be subject to liability under UNCLOS
for claims made by other states.194 Non-signatory parties could voluntarily agree
to arbitration under ITLOS but doing so does not seem to be in their rational selfinterest. Because not all states are then bound to ITLOS as a dispute resolution
mechanism, the solution offered above may not be universal in application.
Second, even if a decision is binding, it is not clear how ITLOS would
enforce its arbitration decisions if parties do not comply.195 For example, in the
Arctic Sunrise arbitration, Russia refused to appear before ITLOS or abide by the
tribunal’s ruling.196 ITLOS does not have a security force to implement rulings and
does not have the ability to levy sanctions or restrict access to seaways if states do
not comply with their rulings. States would therefore still need to consent to
whatever ruling ITLOS makes, even if their rulings are technically “binding.” This
critique, however, could likely be levied with any international legal enforcement
mechanism as truly bad actors can continue to evade judgments.
Third, if the injured state and the hacking state have reasonably robust
domestic cable protection schemes, ITLOS may not have jurisdiction. As
discussed above, ITLOS requires states to exercise local remedies before
appealing to ITLOS for dispute resolution. If the offending state has domestic
protections, the injured state can appeal to that state to subject the offenders to
domestic protections. This would result in the offending state being responsible
for enforcing a regime which its citizens, and quite probably state agents, have
violated. The incentives for the offending state to do so are minimal.
This possibility, however, is not fatal to the above solution mechanism.
States can still appeal to UNCLOS for greater clarity for states’ responsibilities for
cable protections on the high seas under Articles 112 and 113 of UNCLOS. States
can further dispute the domestic proceedings as insufficient to compensate the
injured party for potential cable damage or the stolen information. And states can
likely still make claims related to the international right to privacy not addressed
by domestic protections. While this last claim may raise issues around whether
ITLOS is the proper body to hear these complaints, because the conduct occurs
at sea, ITLOS still has a viable claim to jurisdiction.
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Fourth, relatedly, the most probable avenue to obtain jurisdiction under
ITLOS involves damage to submarine cables as a result of hacking. If hacking
technologies are sufficiently sophisticated, they may cause no harm to submarine
cables. Accordingly, states would need to develop alternative reasons to obtain
ITLOS jurisdiction. As discussed above, states can argue for dispute resolution
for interfering with cable operation under Articles 112 or 113. More generally,
states can argue ITLOS’s broad jurisdiction gives them standing, but this also
seems weak.
Alternatively, states can make claims using the more general wording of the
1884 Convention. The 1884 Convention prevents “interference” with telegraph
cables. Because hacking necessarily involves some degree of signal interference of
fiber optic cables, hacking would likely fall into this broader “interference”
category. And because the 1884 Convention does not have a body for dispute
resolution related to obligations under the Convention, states can reasonably
argue ITLOS is the most proper forum to hear disputes.
This argument does not guarantee jurisdiction either. Foremost, the 1884
Convention addresses telegraph cables. While it seems reasonable to extend these
protections to fiber optic or internet cables given the spirit of the Convention, the
1884 Convention is then limited in scope. Further, “interference” is harder to
prove as compared to external damage to cables in hacking attempts. It is more
difficult for signal operators to observe momentary gaps in service as compared
to external cable damage, and maintaining a record showing this interference is
both costly and difficult. Additionally, not many states are parties to the 1884
Convention as compared to UNCLOS. While many of the power players likely to
engage in hacking are parties to both, including Russia and the U.K., some states
are parties only to UNCLOS, like China, or party only to the 1884 Convention,
like the U.S. Finally, the 1884 Convention, like UNCLOS, only presents
obligations for states to create domestic protective schemes for submarine cables.
The 1884 Convention does not have any enforcement mechanisms against this
bad behavior which makes ITLOS’s jurisdiction more specious. And claims
related to U.N. human rights obligations using the 1884 Convention to confer
jurisdiction seem weak.
Fifth, claims of the right to privacy are relatively novel for international
courts and the limits of this right have not been clearly defined. ITLOS, in turn,
may not make sweeping decisions related to hacking for these types of cases
without further clarity on the scope of the right to privacy. ITLOS may instead
resolve the dispute by requiring greater compensatory damages or greater
domestic protections for damage to cables without resolving the issue of hacking.
This result may incidentally reduce hacking by raising the possible costs associated
with hacking attempts, but states may still find the possible damages as reasonable
to the perceived intelligence gains from hacking. Accordingly, privacy suits may
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need to wait for greater international consensus on the limits of the right to
privacy.
This solution, however, can build on changing norms around the right to
privacy. As discussed in Section V, the international right to privacy is increasingly
recognized on the global stage. This solution presents novel questions within this
ongoing debate. The recognition of the right to privacy depends largely on
“effective control” of the persons or territory involved in the surveillance. 197
Submarine cables present novel questions around this effective control as it is
nearly certain that at least some of a state’s citizens’ communications will be
obtained through a submarine cable hack. Is this incidental acquisition enough to
violate standards against countries surveilling their own citizens arbitrarily?
Further, submarine cables are simultaneously a protected and necessary state
resource and located on the high seas. Cables may then be a useful framing to
consider how much control and sovereignty states have over their cyber space.
Are cables more like physical territory or more like ephemeral cyber space in
considering sovereignty and does the distinction ultimately matter with respect to
privacy rights? This Comment is unable to answer these questions fully, but the
Comment’s solution opens novel avenues for argument around these themes and
may help advance the dialogue with respect to privacy rights.
Sixth, some states may not want to pursue creating a regime against
submarine cable hacking. As discussed in Section II, many global powers,
including the U.S., China, the U.K., and Russia, engage in submarine cable
hacking. States, particularly those with robust submarine military presences, may
want to preserve the ability to surveil other states using submarine cable hacking.
These states would therefore not invoke ITLOS or the right to privacy against
submarine cable hacking. This may be a particularly onerous challenge because
these powerful states often develop and enforce global norms.
As discussed in Section III, however, this criticism may not necessarily be
fatal to the solution offered above. Norms with respect to submarine cables and
hacking in general appear to be shifting. Smaller states or landlocked states that
do not engage in submarine cable hacking have incentives to further develop these
norms to protect their citizens’ privacy and governmental data without the
counterincentive of preserving the right to hack other states. While this shift may
take time to play out, the momentum is in favor of increased recognition of
privacy rights as discussed in Section V. Regardless, as hacking increases and as
the associated damage from hacking rises, international legal solutions may be
more cost effective than patrolling the seas against hacking attempts. Accordingly,
states may decide international norms are a more cost-effective way of reducing
hacking activity levels.
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Seventh, if states elect not to pursue a hacking complaint against another
state for geopolitical reasons, the injured cable operator may not be able to use
ITLOS to seek a suitable remedy. In most cases, the injured party is likely a
corporation. Due to the terrific costs in laying submarine cables, the majority of
modern-day cables are owned and laid by private companies and collectives. For
example, Google has backed at least 14 cables globally and other tech firms have
similarly pursued their own submarine cable systems.198 Accordingly, corporations
often foot the bill for cable damage or privacy concerns.199
ITLOS jurisdiction over corporations is somewhat ambiguous but appears
limited. Article 20 of the ITLOS charter provides non-state entities can access to
the Tribunal for cases where other agreements accepted by all parties in the case
confer jurisdiction to ITLOS.200 It is highly unlikely the corporation and the
hacking party will have agreed to dispute resolution by ITLOS in the case of
hacking. Accordingly, when the corporation’s home country elects not to pursue
dispute resolution, ITLOS may not be a viable solution.
This, however, does not entirely eliminate the possibility of enforcing an
anti-hacking regime through corporate action. Depending on the jurisdictional
limits of the corporation’s home country, corporations can pursue private civil
suits against foreign states.201 These actions are generally not taken due to
geopolitical concerns, concerns about comity, and questions about where the
alleged tort occurred.202 The possibility of these suits, however, raises the specter
of private action against hacking malfeasors, which may be worth considering in
subsequent analyses beyond the scope of this Comment.

VIII. C ONCLUSION
This Comment examined whether states had any recourse under public
international law when foreign states hacked into submarine cables. In so doing,
this Comment explored public international law around submarine cables (Section
IV) and public international law with respect to hacking (Section V) to conclude
states can use the International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) invoke
liability (Section VI). This Comment argued ITLOS would have proper
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jurisdiction over submarine hacking claims and would be a suitable body to
address these complaints due to the weakness of domestic cable protections. This
Comment argued states have two avenues for establishing liability through
ITLOS: damage to cables or violations of the international right to privacy. This
Comment thus invokes broader discussion of how states can seek legal recourse
against submarine cable hacking while norms and conventions addressing hacking
and submarine cables continue to develop.
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